VENUE IN CIVIL CASES IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT by DOBIE, ARMISTEAD M.
YALE
LAW JOURNAL
Vol. XXXV DECEMBER, 1925 No. 2
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1. JURISDICTION AND VENUE DISTINGUISHED
Jurisdiction aizd Venue Distbignished
Venue must first be carefully and accurately distinguished from
jurisdiction. 2  "Jurisdiction", said Mr. Justice Brown, - "is the
power to adjudicate a case upon the merits, and dispose of it as
justice may require." Venue has reference merely to the pace
of the suit. Jurisdiction is a question of the power of the court;
venue, of locality. Jurisdiction controls the judicial capacity to
I This article forms part of a chapter in a book on federal procedure
by the author, shortly to be published by the West Publishing Company.
The remaining portion will deal with Venue under Special Statutes, and
Venue under Criminal Statutes.
2 See Dobie, Venue in the United States District Court (1914) 2 VA. L.
REv. 1. The present article, however, is not a re-hashing of that article
but is entirely new.
The distinction is thus aptly put by Mr. Justice Gray in latcrior Con-
struction Co. v. Gibney (1895) 160 U. S. 217, 219-220, 10 Sup. Ct. 272, 273:
"Diversity of citizenship is a condition of jurisdiction, and, when that
does not appear upon the record, the court, of its own motion, will order
the action to be dismissed. But the provision as to the particular district
in which the action shall be brought does not touch the general jurisdiction
of the court over such a cause between such parties- but affects only the
proceedings taken to bring the defendant within suck jurisdiction, and is
a matter of personal privilege, which the defendant may insist upon, or
may waive, at his election; and the defendant's right to object that an
action, within the general jurisdiction of the court, is brought in the wrong
district, is waived by entering a general appearance, without taking the
objection."
Many writers and judges use the term "jurisdiction over the subject
matter" for jurisdiction, and "jurisdiction over the person" for venue.
When the words are understood to be used in the designated technical
sense, the nomenclature "jurisdiction" and "venue", though, is believed to
be preferable.
3 The Resolute (1897) 168 U. S. 437, 439, 18 Sup. Ct. 112, 113.
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hear the case; venue 4 answers only the question of where the
case should be heard.
The jurisdiction of the United States District Court concerns
the various classes of cases that this court can decide, and defines
and limits the powers of the United States District Court as a
part of the judicial machinery of the federal government. It is
only after the question of the jurisdiction of this court is an-
swered in the affirmative that the question of venue ever arises.
Then the geographical issue must be determined-where the suit
is to be brought, the venue. It is obvious that if the United
States District Court cannot entertain jurisdiction of a case, this
effectually stifles any question of venue. A technical statement
that the United States District Court has jurisdiction-connotes
first that this case is within the constitutional grant of federal
judicial power to the United States and secondly that the case
falls under the part of that power conferred by Congress on the
district court, leaving open the question which district court
(district and sometimes division) should properly try the case.
The contrary assertion that the United States District Court has
not jurisdiction of the case means that no district court, whatever
the district and division for which it sits, has power to adjudicate
that case.
When the question of jurisdiction of the district court has been
decided by that court adversely to the plaintiff, and a final judg-
ment entered, this becomes res adjudicata, which can be attacked
only upon appeal; it cannot be raised again by bringing the suit
in the district court of another district. The decision of the ques-
tion of venue adversely to the plaintiff, holding the venue im-
proper, leaves the disappointed litigant free to bring this suit in
the district court of another locality (district and division) ; and,
if he does this, the question of the propriety of the second venue
may then be raised and decided.
Venue may be Waived, either Expressly or Impliedly
As has already been pointed out,5 jurisdiction can never be
conferred on the district court by waiver or consent of the parties.
It must affirmatively appear from the record; it is always before
the court, both trial and appellate during the progress of the case;
and the court, of its own motion without any suggestion from the
litigants, may raise and pass on the question.
Venue, on the other hand, is freely waivable.0 This is the most
important legal difference flowing from the distinction between
4 Questions of venue are quite ancient in the common law. A brief but
interesting account of the historical and technical development of venuo
will be found in Scott, Fundamentals of Procedure in Actions at Law
(1922) 18-23.
G Supra note 1.
6 See cases cited in succeeding notes.
VENUE IN CIVIL CASES
venue and jurisdiction. Venue is a mere personal privilege, the
privilege (if the litigant cares to assert it) of being sued in a
particular district or division. Unless the litigant himsew
specially raises the question, it is not before the court, for the
judge cannot, of his own motion, either raise or decide the ques-
tion, even though the venue is manifestly improper 8
The only method by which this question of venue can be raised
is by a special appearance in linzine for that purpose; for any
general appearance is a complete waiver, and venue once waived
cannot be questioned subsequently in the caseY Thus venue is
waived by a demurrer on other grounds going to the merits,0 by
filing an amended petition and stipulations for continuance," by
removing the case to the United States District Court from a
state court, -1 2 by an affidavit of defenses going to the merits,' 3
by proceeding beyond the pleadings and taking testimony.'" Nor
can a general appearance be united with a special appearance
for the purpose of questioning the venue. 2  Whatever the nature
of the appearance, consent or plea, if it amounts to a general
7And only the litigant whose residence does not conform to the require-
ments of venue can raise it. Central Trust Co. v. McGcorge (1894) 151
U. S. 129, 14 Sup. Ct. 286; Camp1919) 250 U. S. 308, 39 Sup.
Ct. 478; Horn v. Pere Marquette Ry. (1907, C. C. E. D. MIich.) 151 Fed.
626.
8 See In re Moore (1908) 209 U. S. 490, 28 Sup. Ct. 585; s. C. 70G, and
cases subsequently cited.
9Jones v. Andrews (1870, U. S.) 10 Wall. 327; St. Louis & San Fran-
cisco Ry. v. McBride (1891) 141 U. S. 127, 11 Sup. CL 982; Southern
Pacific Co. v. Denton (1892) 146 U. S. 202, 13 Sup. Ct. 44; Ingerooll v.
Coram (1908) 211 U. S. 335, 29 Sup. Ct. 92; General InvestmCnt Co. v.
Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. (1922) 260 U. S. 261, 43 Sup. Ct. 100; Panama
R. R. v. Johnson (1924) 264 U. S. 375, 44 Sup. Ct. 391.
'Olngersoll v. Coram, supra note 8; By-Products Recovery Co. v. Mabe
(1923, N. D. Ohio) 288 Fed. 401.
-"In re Moore, supra note 8.
12 Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. (1923) 260 U. S. 653, 43 Sup. Ct. 230;
Memphis Savings Bank v. Houchens (1902, C. C. A. 8th) 115 Fed. 96;
Baldwin v. Pacific Power & Light Co. (1912, D. C. Or.) 199 Fed. 291.
13 United States v. Schofield Co. (1910, C. C. E. D. Pa.) 182 Fed. 240.
Also by motion to vacate an order going to the merits. Blucfields S. S.
Co. v. Steele (1911, C. C. A. 3d) 184 Fed. 584.
14 General Electric Co. v. Wagner Mfg. Co. (1903, C. C. S. D. N. Y.)
123 Fed. 101.
3 5Jones v. Andrews, supra note 9; Southern Pacific Co. v. Denton, -upra
note 9; Western L. & S. Co. v. Butte & B. Cons. Min. Co. (1908) 210 U. S.
368, 28 Sup. Ct. 720; Baltimore & Ohio Ry. v. Doty (1904, C. C. ;A. th)
133 Fed. 866; Campbell v. Johnson (1909, C. C. A. 9th) 107 Fed. 102. But
see Southern Pacific Co. v. Arlington Heights Co. (1911, C. C. A. 0th) 191
Fed. 101.
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appearance (and the Supreme Court seems prone so to construe
it), then such appearance precludes the possibility of the ques-
tion of venue being raised at any later stage of the proceedings.
But when a defendant first objects seasonably and properly to
the venue, and then, after his objection is overruled and proper
exception taken, he pleads to the merits and goes to trial, he has
not waived the question of venue and may again raise the ques-
tion in the appellate court.0
Venue Important only in the District Court
Under the federal judicial system, the question of venue gives
difficulty only in the district court. There are nine circuit courts
of appeals, each with appellate jurisdiction only. Appeals go
to the circuit court of appeals for the circuit embracing the state
within which is the district for which the district court sits.T
And there is only one Supreme Court.
2. THE GENERAL FEDERAL STATUTE OF VENUE
Section 51 of the Judicial Code provides:
"Except as provided in the five succeeding sections, no person
shall be arrested in one district for trial in another, in any civil
action before a district court; and, except as provided in the six
succeeding sections, no civil suit shall be brought in any district
court against any person by any original process or proceeding
in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant; but
where the jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the action
is between citizens of different states, suit shall be brought only
in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the de-
fendant."
This is the provision of widest general application on the sub-
ject of venue. A clear distinction is made by this section between
cases in the district court (1) when diversity of state citizenship
is the only ground of jurisdiction; (2) when jurisdiction may be
based on any ground other than diversity of state citizenship.
Under (1), the plaintiff has an election between two districts
-the district of the plaintiff or the district of the defendant-
either of which is proper. Under (2), there is no election but
only a single proper district-the district of the defendant. In
neither case can suit be properly bro'ught in one of more than
two districts, the residence of the plaintiff or the residence of
10 Vidal v. South American Securities Co. (1921, C. C. A. 2d) 276 Fed.
855. See also Harkness v. Hyde (1878) 98 U. S. 476, 479; Southern Pa-
cific Co. v. Denton, supra. note 9, at 206; Goldey v. Morning News (1895)
156 U. S. 518, 15 Sup. Ct. 559. Nor can he be deprived of this privilege
by any rule of a lower federal court. Davidson Marble Co. v. Gibson
(1909) 213 U. S. 10, 29 Sup. Ct. 324.
17 Judicial Code, sec. 128 (a), as amended by the Act of February 13,
1925. Provision is also made for appeals from the courts in Alaska, China,
the Canal Zone and the island dependencies.
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the defendant. When the suit is between citizens of different
states (no other ground of jurisdiction eisting),15 the districts
of the plaintiff and defendant, and also their states, being neces-
sarily different, the plaintiff has a choice (or at least a potential
choice) between his own district and that of his adversary. There
are, however, as will be seen, many restrictions, developed by the
courts, which, even in these cases, greatly limit the exercise of
this option.
These statutory restrictions, as construed by the federal courts,
were enacted to safeguard the interests of defendants from the
abuse of their rights as to the locality of suits against them. That
same statute has seriously hampered the federal courts in the
exercise of the jurisdiction and powers conferred upon them. It
has given rise to many difficult questions; the cases dealing with
those questions are legion.
Under this statute come the vast majority of these cases. In
the "six succeeding sections" to Section 51, provision has been
made for dealing specifically with certain exceptional cases. Thus,
Section 52 applies, in suits not of a local nature, when a single
state "contains more than one district." Under Section 53, pro-
vision is made, in suits not of a local nature, "when a district
contains more than one division" for the division in which suit
lies; and this section applies to both civil and criminal cases, to
cases originally brought in the district cburt and to cases removed
thereto. Section 54 applies in local actions, "where the defendant
resides in a different district, in the same State, from that in
which suit is brought"; while Section 55 covers suits of a local
nature when the land""lies partly in one district and partly in
another, within the same state." The powers of a receiver are
broadened under Section 56 to cover land and fixed property
"within different States in the same judicial circuit." Section
57, which is quite important, permits certain in rew proceedings
to be instituted in the district where the res is situated, with
provision for service on absent defendants. These will all in
turn be discussed.
3. "INHABITANT" AND "RESIDENCE"
Resident, Iviabitant and Citizen
The words "resident" and "inhabitant" are synonymous here."'
Is When jurisdiction can be grounded either on diver.e citizenship or
some other ground (e.g. federal question), then jurisdiction is not "founded
only on the fact that the action is between citizens of different statez" and
the only proper venue is the district of the defendant. Macon Groccn, Co.
-v. Atlantic Coast Line By. (1910) 215 U. S. 501, 30 Sup. Ct 184; Covild
v. Atchinson, T. & S. F. Ry. (1909, C. C. W. D. Te%.) 173 Fed. 527; Trapp
v,. Baltimore & Ohio Ry. (1922, N. D. Ohio) 283 Fed. 655.
19 United States 'v. Gronich (1914, W. D. Wash.) 211 Fed. 548; Thoma3
v. South Butte Mining Co. (1916, C. C. A. 9th) 230 Fed. 960.
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"The word 'inhabitant', in that act, was apparently used, not in
any larger meaning than 'citizen', but to avoid the incongruity of
speaking of a citizen of anything less than a State, when the in-
tention was to cover not only a district which included a whole
State, but also two districts in one State." 20 "Residence" and
"domicile", it is well known, have quite different technical mean-
ings, but the two are generally used as synonymous in the Judi-
cial Code.
Natural Persons
A natural person, who is a citizen of the United States and.
of a state, is an inhabitant of the district of that state within
which he has his domicile or permanent home. 21 That is his
district and, when he is the sole plaintiff or sole defendant, it is
the district of the plaintiff or the district of the defendant. An
individual who retains his citizenship in the United States (and
thus is not an alien) but has no domicile in the United States,
is neither a citizen of a state nor the inhabitant of a district. A
Since an individual can have but a single domicile, he can have
but one district. All the difficulties, both legal and factual, that
beset the determination of an individual's domicile attend equally
upon fixing his district.
Corporations
A corporation is an inhabitant of the state that creates it, the
state of its incorporation, and of the district (when that state
comprises more than one district) of the corporation's head
office.23  Thus the Albemarle Pippin Corporation, incorporated
under the laws of Virginia, with its head office at Charlottesville,
is an inhabitant of the Western District of Virginia, and of no
other district.
By doing business in another district, however great its volume
and however important its character, the corporation does not
20 Mr. Justice Gray in Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co. (1892) 145 U. S. 444,
447, 12 Sup. Ct. 935, 936.21 Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., supra note 20; King v. United States
(1893, C. C. S. C.) 59 Fed. 9; United States v. Gronich, supra note 19.
22 See the very interesting case of Hammerstein v. Lync (1912, W. D.
Mo.) 200 Fed. 165.23 Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., supra note 20; Galveston, Harrisburg &
S. A. Ry. v. Gonzales (1894) 151 U. S. 496, 14 Sup. Ct. 401; In rc Keasbey
& Mattison Co. (1895) 160 U. S. 221, 16 Sup. Ct. 273; Texas & Pacific Ry.
v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1896) 162 U. S. 197, 204, 16 Sup. Ct.
666; Matter of Dunn (1908) 212 U. S. 374, 29 Sup. Ct. 299 (corporation
created by Congress); Macon Grocery Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry.,
supra note 18. See also Firestone Tire & Equipment Co. v. Vehicle Equip-
ment Co. (1907, C. C. E. D. N. Y.) 155 Fed. 676; Lemon v. Imperial Win-
dew Glass Co. (1912, N. D. W. Va.) 199 Fed. 927; Guaranty Trust Co. v.
McCabe (1918, C. C. A. 2d) 250 Fed. 699. These last cases illustrate the
difficulty sometimes encountered, of fixing the district of the head office of
the corporation.
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become an inhabitant of such other district.4  In Gdlveston,
Harrisburg & San Antonio Railway Co. v. Gonzales,2- a Mexican
(an alien) brought suit in the Western District of Texas against
a Texas corporation with its principal office in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Texas, and, though the corporation operated a railroad
and had stations in the Western District of Texas, the venue was
held improper.
A stipulation by a corporation authorizing service of process
within a certain state upon its agents there, or upon a designated
officer of the state, does not make the corporation (incorporated
in another state) an "inhabitant" of the state wherein the stipu-
lation is filed. Such a stipulation concerns only the service of
process, and is not a waiver of the corporation's privilege to be
sued in the proper district as defined by the general statute of
venue. -6
Aliens
An alien individual is one who has not by virtue of either birth
or naturalization citizenship in the United States; a corporation
is an alien here when it is incorporated under the laws of a
foreign country. No alien, individual or corporate, is an inhabi-
tant of any district; he, or it, is districtless.
When an alien is a defenciant, he is without the protection of
the venue statutes, 7 and may be sued in any district in which he
is found and where valid service of process may be made upon
him.218 "To construe the provision as applicable to all suits be-
tween a citizen and an alien would leave the courts of the United
States open to aliens against citizens, and close them to citizens
against aliens. Such a construction is not required by the lan-
guage of the provision, and would be inconsistent with the general
intent of the section as a whole." 20
24 McCormick Co. v. WaIthers (1890) 134 U. S. 41, 43, 10 Sup. CL 485;
Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co. (1892) 145 U. S. 444, 12 Sup. CL 935; Southern
Pacific Co. v. Denton, supra note 9; Macon, Grocery Co. -. Atlantic Coast
Line Ry. (1910) 215 U. S. 501, 509, 30 Sup. Ct. 184; United State3 v.
Swtter Co. (1901, C. C. S. D. Ala.) 110 Fed. 1; Wolff & Co. v. Choctaw
0. & G. Ry. (1904, C. C. E. D. Ark.) 133 Fed. 601; McNcely v. Du Pont
de Nemours Powder Co. (1920, D. C. Del.) 263 Fed. 252.
25Supra note 23. See also Southcrn Pacific Co. v. Denton, supr7a note 9.
20 Southern Pacific Co. v. Denton, supra note 9; Platt -e. Massachusctts
Real-Estate Co. (1900, C. C. Mlass.) 103 Fed. 705; Hagstoz V. Mutnal Life
Ins. Co. (1910, C. C. E. D. Pa.) 179 Fed. 569.
.7 This was expressly provided in the original Judiciary Act of 1789.
The same spirit remains, though this express provision has disappeared
from subsequent statutes.
28 In 3eIhorst (1893) 150 U. S. 653, 14 Sup. Ct. 221; Barrow Stcam-
ship Co. v. Kane (1898) 170 U. S. 100, 18 Sup. Ct. 526; Ricordi v. John
Church Co. (1902, C. C. S. D. N. Y.) 114 Fed. 1023; Hall v. Great Northern.
Ry. (1912, D. C. Mlont.) 197 Fed. 488; Bradshaw v. Bowden (1914, W. D.
Wash.) 226 Fed. 323.
29 Mr. Justice Gray in In re Hohorst, supra note 28, at 660.
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When the alien is plaintiff, however, in a suit against the citi-
zen of a state (whether individual or corporation), the statute
is applicable. Necessarily, then, thfe suit must be brought, as the
only proper venue, in the district of the defendant.30 Thus the
venue statute controls suits by aliens but not suits against them.
4. COPLAINTIFFS, OR CODEFENDANTS, INHABITANTS OF
DIFFERENT STATES
The rule of the general venue statute- (venue in diverse citi-
zenship cases 31 may be the district of either the plaintiff or de-
fendant; venue in other cases must be the district of the defen-
dant)-is subject to an important qualification which greatly
restricts venue. That qualification is that the terms "plaintiff"
and "defendant" are both used collectively to mean all the plain-
tiffs or all the defendants.32 With but a single plaintiff and a
single defendant, this principle is never called into operation;
with a plurality of litigants, it becomes tremendously important.
For "when the plaintiffs are from different districts, thefe is no
district of the plaintiff; when the defendants are from different
districts, there is no district whereof the defendant is an inhabi-
tant.
Thus, when jurisdiction is not founded solely on diverse citizen-
ship, so that the venue must be based on the residence of the
defendant, if there are two or more defendants from different
districts, since there is no district of (i.e. common to) all the de-
fendants, there is then no district of the defendant, and hence
no district in which the venue is proper. So that when a suit
not founded solely on diverse citizenship is brought against A
(of the Eastern District of North Carolina) and B (of the
Western District of Virginia), neither of these districts is the
district of all the defendants, and there is no proper venue in
either district.
In diverse citizenship cases, though the district may be that of
either the plaintiff or the defendant, the same principles are appli-
cable. So that if A (of the Northern District of Florida) wishes
to bring suit, based solely on diverse citizenship, against B (of
the Western District of Virginia.) and C (of the Eastern District
30 Galveston, Harrisburg & S. A. Ry. v. Gonzales, supra note 23;
Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Washko (1916, C. C. A. 2d) 231 Fed. 42; Vitl=
v. Clyde Steamship Co. (1916, E. D. N. Y.) 232 Fed. 288; Vidal v. South
American Securities Co., supra note 16; Coty v. Prestonettes, Inc. (1922,
C. C. A. 2d) 285 Fed. 501.
31 This phrase-"Diverse citizenship cases"--will be used in this article
to indicate cases where the jurisdiction is f'unded only on the fact that
the action is between citizens of different states.
32 Smith v. Lyon (1890) 133 U. S. 315, 10 Sup. Ct. 303; Sweeney v. Carter
Oil Co. (1905) 199 U. S. 252, 26 Sup. Ct. 55; Camp v. Gres, supra note
6; Freeman v. American Surety Co. (1902, C. C. N. . va) 116 Fed.
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of North Carolina), then, since there is no district common to
all the defendants, the venue must be based on the district of the
residence of the single plaintiff, A; and the only proper venue
would be the Northern District of Florida. 3 Or, to take a more
distressing case, suppose A (of the Northern District of Florida)
and B (of the Southern District of Georgia) wish as plaintiffs
to sue, on the ground of diverse citizenship, in the United States
District Court, C (of the Western District of Virginia) and D
(of the Eastern District of North Carolina) as defendants. Here
there is no district in which the venue is proper, for there is no
district common either to all the plaintiffs or to all the defendants.
If these parties were all indispensable, and if the defendants
would not waive the impropriety of the venue (the plaintiffs, of
course, would waive it by bringing the suit in any district court),
then no district court of the United States in any district would
entertain the suit.
When Parties are not Indispcnsablc
Section 50 of the Judicial Code provides:
"When there are several defendants in any suit at law or in
equity, and one or more of them are neither inhabitants of nor
found within the district in which the suit is brought, and do not
voluntarily appear, the court may entertain jurisdiction, and pro-
ceed to the trial and adjudication of the suit between the parties
who are properly before it; but the judgment or decree rendered
therein shall not conclude or prejudice other parties not regularly
served with process nor voluntarily appearing to answer; and
nonjoinder of parties who are not inhabitants of nor found within
the district, as aforesaid, shall not constitute matter of abatement
or objection to the suit."
This partly alleviates the rigor of the qualification introduced
by a plurality of litigants. It applies broadly in terms to both
actions at law and suits in equity, when a judgment or decree is
possible as to the parties before the court without prejudicing
the rights of the absent parties.z4 When the absent party, how-
ever, is indispensable r (as distinguished from merely proper or
548; McAulay v. Moody (1911, C. C. Or.) 185 Fed. 144; Revctt v C~sc
(1913, W. D. Wash.) 207 Fed. 673; Turk vi. Ili1,wis Central Ry. (1914,
C. C. A. 6th) 218 Fed. 315; Gotter v. McCuzlcy (1923, E. D. Wash.) 292
Fed. 382.
33 See Camp v. Gress, supra note 7; Hardin v. Southcru Ry. (1024,
N. D. Ga.) 300 Fed. 417. In Swcegcy v. Cartcr Oil Co., supra, note 32,
A (of Pa.) and B (of N. Y.) sued the C corporation (incorporated in
W. Va., with its head office in, the Northern District of W. Va.) in the
Northern District of West Virginia. The venue was held to be proper.
Since the plaintiffs were from different states, no other proper venue
could be found.
34 Wateman v. Canal-Louisiana, Bank & Trust Co. (1909) 215 U. S. 33,
48, 30 Sup. Ct. 10.
3' In Shields v. Barrow (1854, U. S.) 17 How. 130, 139, indispensable
parties are described as "persons who not only have an interest in the
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necessary), so that no judgment or decree can be had without
affecting his rights, then Section 50 does not apply.30
Somewhat similar, but much narrower in scope, is Equity Rule
39, which prevents the abatement of suits for non-joinder of
necessary or proper parties. It, too, is inapplicable to indispen-
sable parties.3 7
5. VENUE AND PROCESS
Venue Complicated by Process
In the main, Congress (except as to districts within the same
state) has dealt with districts rather as separate states than as
counties within the same state. So that the ordinary civil proc-
ess in the district court does not run beyond the confines of the
district in which it is issued.8  Under the "due process" clause
of the Constitution this normally implies that no in pers6nam
judgment can be obtained against 'a defendant unless such de-
fendant is served in the district in which the suit is brought.
Thus is introduced another complication, rendering the practical
problem of suitable venue often difficult, sometimes impossible.
Process and venue are quite distinct, yet each qualifies and limits
the other. After a district, proper on the score of venue, has
been selected, there yet remains the question of whether the de-
fendant can be validly served in this district. A plurality of
defendants in both cases lends still further complications to the
problem.
A flesh and blood individual may be served in any district in
which he may be physically found with the process of that dis-
trict. Apart from methods of service (not appropriate for dis-
cussion here), individuals usually present little legal difficulty.
Service of Process on Corporations
Normal and perfect service on a corporation would contemplate
service in the single district of which it is an inhabitant. Very
frequently, however, it is necessary to serve process upon the
controversy, but an interest of such a nature that a final decree cannot
be made without either affecting that interest, or leaving the controversy
in such a condition that its final termination may be wholly inconsistent
with equity and good conscience."
36 Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., loc. cit. supra, note
34; Bogart v. Southern Pacific Co. (1913) 228 U. S. 137, 33 Sup. Ct. 497;
Camp v. Gress, supra note 7; United Shoe Machinery Co. v. United States
<1922) 258 U. S. 451, 456, 42 Sup. Ct. 363. See also Brown v. Crawford
(1918, D. C. Or.) 252 Fed. 248; Niles.Bement-Pond Co. v. Iron Moulders'
Union (1920) 254 U. S. 77, 41 Sup. Ct. 39; McLean v. Bradley (1922, N. D.
Ohio) 282 Fed. 1011.437Nelson v. Herbert (1924, C. C. A. 5th) 296 Fed. 445. See also Su-
preme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble (1921) 255 U. S. 356, 41 Sup. Ct. 338;
Lecouturier v. Ickelheimer (1913, S. D. N. Y.) 205 Fed. 682.
38 Toland v. Sprague (1838, U. S.) 12 Pet. 300, 330; Herndon W. Ridgway
(1854, U. S.) 17 How. 424; Insurance Co. v. Bangs (1880) 103 U. S. 435.
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corporation in some district other than its own. Then is en-
countered another limitation: the corporation cannot be validly
served in a district unless it is "doing business" in that district;
and this is true even though the president and other corporate
officers may at the time be physically present within the district.
This principle has, in many cases, been rigidly upheld by the
federal courts.3 9
Thus in a suit, based solely on diverse citizenship, by A (of
Charlottesville, Va.) against the B corporation (incorporated in
laryland, doing no business in the Western District of Virginia),
while the Western District of Virginia (district of the plaintiff)
would be technically proper from the venue standpoint, the plain-
tiff, A, since the defendant could not be served in that district,
would be driven to sue in the defendant's district, the District of
Maryland. Or suppose a suit based on diverse citizenship, by
this same A, as plaintiff, against this same B corporation and C
(of Delaware), as defendants. Here, since the defendants are
from different districts, the venue must be the district of the
single plaintiff; but in this district (though the venue is proper),
no valid service can be had on the B corporation. Accordingly,
unless this defect be waived, the plaintiff is denied entrance into
the United States District Court.
What Conzstittes "Doing Busin-ess"
There are literally hundreds of cases dealing with the question
of what constitutes "doing business" on the part of a corporation
so as to render it amenable to service. 0 The dominant idea seems
to be that the term "doing business" in this connection connotes
See also the recent case of Mu1nter s,. Well Co. (1923) 261 U. S. 270, 279,
in which the court said: "The service on Munter was void. The District
Court of Connecticut had no power to send its process to New Yorl: for
service." See also Robertson z. Railroad Labor Board (1925, U. S.) 45 Sup.
Ct. 621.
-'Ex parte Schollenberger (1877) 96 U. S. 369; N1cw England Mitual
Life Ins. Co. v. Woodworth (1884) 111 U. S. 138, 4 Sup. Ct. 064; Conlcy
v. Mathieson Alkali Works (1903) 190 U. S. 400, 23 Sup. Ct. 723; Gccr v.
Mathieson Alkali Works (1903) 190 U. S. 428, 23 Sup. Ct. 807; Kendall v.
American Automatic Loom Co. (1905) 198 U. S. 477, 25 Sup. Ct. 703; Grccn
v. Chicago, BurlIngton & Quincy Ry. (1907) 205 U. S. 530, 27 Sup. CL
595; L miere v. Mae Edna Wilder, Inc. (1923) 261 U. S. 174, 43 Sup. Ct.
312; Goepfert v. Compagnie Ginerale Transatlantiquc (1907, C. C. E. D.
Pa.) 156 Fed. 196; Noel Construction Co. r. Smith & Co. (1911, 0. C.
21d.) 193 Fed. 492; Ostrander v. Deerficld Lvnbcr Co. (1913, N. D. X. Y.)
206 Fed. 540; Moore Dry Goods Co. v. Conamcrcial Indust3rial Co. (1922,
C. C. A. 9th) 2S2 Fed. 21. See also Mechanical Appliance Co. v. Ca-tle-
nzan (1910) 215 U. S. 437, 30 Sup. Ct, 125; Riversidc Mills v. Mc.efcc
(1915) 237 U. S. 189, 35 Sup. Ct 579.
- For an exhaustive digest on the general question, see Report of the
Commissioner on State Laws Concenzing State Laws Concerning Foreign
Corporations (1915) 156-163. See also Words & Phraccs under "Doing
Business". The question arises in many connections other than the one
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some continuity, a series of tiansactions in the line of the cor-
poration's business rather than one transaction or even several
single, and somewhat isolated and unrelated, transactions. No
extended discussion can be attempted here beyond the considera-
tion of a few representative cases.
A railroad company which has no tracks within the district is
not "doing business" therein merely because it hires an office
and employs an agent (within the district) for the merely inci-
dental business of solicitation of freight and passenger traffic. 41
Nor does a railway company do business in the district merely
because another railway company, of which it owns practically
the entire capital stock, does business therein.42
"A fire insurance company which issues its policies upon real
estate and personal property situated in another State is as much
engaged in its business when its agents are there under its au-
thority adjusting the losses covered by its policies as it is when
engaged in making contracts to take such risks. If not doing
business, in such case, what is it doing? . . . This is not
a sporadic case, nor the contracts in suit the only ones of their
kind issued upon property within the State. . . . Many con-
tracts of the nature of the one in suit were entered into by the
company covering property within the State." 43
"At the office in Philadelphia, the corporation kept its regular
business ledgers, its stock transfer books and stock ledgers. The
bookkeeper of the company had his desk in the office at Phila-
delphia, made his entries in the corporation books kept there, and
conducted general correspondence in relation to the Company's
business at that office. The treasurer of the company maintained
the only treasurer's office of the company there, and had there
his desk, papers, and books. The company had four bank ac-
counts in Philadelphia, into which accounts, from time to time,
was deposited the surplus of cash not needed in the active opera-
tion of the company." 44 The company was held to be amenable
to process in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
6. LOCAL ACTIONS
Local and Transitory Actions
This distinction between local and transitory actions goes back
to very far off days, yet the line of demarcation between the two
now under discussion. Many of the cases are in more or less direct con-
flict.
41 Green v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry., supra note 39.
42 Peterson v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. (1907) 205 U. S. 364,
27 Sup. Ct. 513. See also the recent case of Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy
Packing Co. (1925) 267 U. S. 333, 45 Sup. Ct. 250.
43 Mr. Justice Peckham in Pennsylvania Insurance Co. v. Meyer (1905)
197 U. S. 407, 415, 25 Sup. Ct. 483.
44Mr. Justice Day in Washington-Virginia Ry. v. Real Estate Trzst Co.
(1915) 238 U. S. 185, 188, 35 Sup. Ct. 818.
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has been, and still remains, obscure and uncertain. Mlost of the
judges have followed ancient saws and sayings with little or no
attempt to analyze the nature and validity of the underlying
reasons.
"The distinction taken is, that actions are deemed transitory,
where transactions on which they are founded, might have taken
place any where; but are local, where their cause is, in its nature,
necessarily local." 43 This is the stock distinction which says
little and affords scant assistance. 0
"The courts have drawn a distinction between transitory and
local actions, holding that the former may be brought in any
jurisdiction, the latter only in a particular jurisdiction. What
is the nature and what is the basis of this distinction? It is
obvious that an action to recover possessioi of specifie land, or
to affect the title thereto or some interest thercin, is maintainable
only in the jurisdiction in which the property involved is situated.
Unless it has jurisdiction of the property, a state has no power
to afford the remedy sought, and cannot confer jurisdiction upon
its courts. Such proceedings, which are called proceedings ia
rem, are properly held to be local, in that they can be brought
only in the particular jurisdiction where the property sought to
be affected thereby is situated. . . . It would seem on prin-
ciple that the natural distinction is between proceedings in rem
and proceedings in personam; that proceedings in rcm should be,
and under well-settled principles of the conflict of laws, must be
local, but that proceedings in personam should be transitory. In
other words, the character of the remedy sought, rather than the
character of the plaintiff's rights, should determine whether an
action is local or transitory." 4T It is respectfully suggested that
Professor Scott here suggests the only basis of distinction that
can stand rational analysis on principle.
On both reason and authority, such actions as ejectment,3 and
partition' 9 seem local; for they clearly affect the title to land or
some interest therein. The great clash has come on actions for
-1 Chief Justice Marshall in Livingston v. Jefferson (1811, C. C. Va.) 1
Brock. 203, 209.
46 See Bouvier's Law Dictionary and Cyclopedic Law Dictionary under
"Local Action."
47 Scott, op. cit. supra note 4, at 2, 31 (Italics the present writer's).
This little book contains one of the most scholarly discussions to be found
in the books of the distinctions between local and transitory actions and
between jurisdiction and venue.
48 Northern Indiana Co. v. Michigan Cent. Co. (1853, U. S.) 15 How.
233; Elk Garden Co. v. Thayer Co. (1910, C. C. W. D. Va.) 179 Fed. 55G;
Kentucky Coal Lands Co. v. Mineral Developmznt Co. (1914, C. C. A. Qth)
219 Fed. 45.
49 Greeley v. Lowe (1894) 155 U. S. 58, 15 Sup. Ct. 24; German Saving.
& Loan Society v. Tull (1905, C. C. A. 9th) 136 Fed. 1, certiorari denied
(1906) 200 U. S. 621, 26 Sup. Ct. 757.
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damages for trespass to land. In the classic case of Livingston
v. Jefferson," Chief Justice Marshall, deciding the case in favor
of his arch enemy Jefferson, held that it was local. This great
jurist decided the case under the principle of stare decisis, taking
pains to point out the illogicality and injustice of the decision.
Yet that, unfortunately, seems to be the law to-day both in the
federal courts and those of the states ;r1 although the proceeding,
since it seeks only the recovery of damages, is clearly in per-
sonam.
Local Actions Must be Brought Where the Land Lies
The general provisions of the venue statute, requiring suit to
be brought in the district of either plaintiff or defendant, do not
apply to local actions; for such actions must be brought in the
district in which the land is situated.52 Yet there seems to be no
federal statute expressly requiring this. And federal process,
save where express statutory warrant is found therefor, is still
limited to the district of the suit5 3 Chief Justice Waite once
said:
"The distinction between local and transitory actions is as old
as actions themselves, and no one has ever supposed that laws
which prescribed generally where one should be sued, included
1  Brock. 203.
51 Professor Scott, in the book quoted from (supra note 47), attacks the
decision with reasons that are believed to be eminently sound. But see
Ellenwood v. Marietta Chair Co. (1895) 158 U. S. 105, 15 Sup. Ct. 771;
Kentucky Coal Lands Co. v. Mineral Development Co. (1911, C. C. E. D.
Ky.) 191 Fed. 899; Potomac M. & I. Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio By. (1914,
D. C. Md.) 217 Fed. 665. See also Dodge v. Colby (1888) 108 N. Y. 445,
15 N. E. 703; Montesano Lumber Co. v. Portland Iron Works (1915) 78
Or. 53, 152 Pac. 244. The Supreme Court of Minnesota, however, bravely
broke away from Livingston v. Jefferson in Little v. Chicago, St. P., M.
& 0. Ry. (1896) 65 Minn. 48, 67 N. W. 846.
52 McKenna v. Fisk (1843, U. S.) 1 How. 241; Northern Indiana Ry. v.
Michigan Central By. (1853, U. S.) 15 How. 233, 242; Mississippi & Mis-
souri Ry. v. Ward (1862, U. S.) 2 Black, 485; Casey v. Adams (1880) 102
U. S. 66, 67; Ellenwood v. Marietta Chair Co., supra note 51; Livingston
v. Jefferson, supra note 50; Kentucky Coal Lands Co. v. Mineral Dovelop-
ment Co., supra note 48.
53 "The general rule is that the circuit court for each district sits in and
for that district, and the process of a circuit court cannot be served with-
out the district in which it is establishu without the special authority of
law therefor." Circuit Judge Simorton in Cely v. Griffln (1902, C. C.
S. C.) 113 Fed. 981. See also Toland v. Sprague, supra note 38; Munter
v. Weil Corset Co., supra note 38; Robertson v. Railroad Labor Board,
supra note 38; Winter v. Koon, Schwaitz & Co. (1904, C. C. Or.) 132
Fed. 273, 274; Horn v. Pere Marquette Ry., supra note 7, at 631.
This principle in Livingston v. Jefferson, supra note 50, denied admission
in the U. S. Courts to Livingston. He could not, under the decision, sue
Jefferson in Virginia, where he could serve process on Jefferson; the venue
was proper in Louisiana where the land was, but, suing there, he could
not get valid service on Jefferson.
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such suits as were local in their character, either by statute or
the common law, unless it was expressly so declared. Local
actions are in the nature of suits in rem, and are to be prosecuted
where the thing on which they are founded is situated."
Local Actions-Different Districts i,6 Same State
Sections 54 and 55 of the Judicial Code relax, as to local ac-
tions, the rigidity of the rules just discussed when there are two
or more districts in the same state. These two sections, however,
have no application whatsoever to districts situated in different
states. Section 54 provides:
"In suits of a local nature, where the defendant resides in a
different district, in the same state, from that in which the suit
is brought, the plaintiff may have original and final process
against him, directed to the marshal of the district in which he
resides."
This covers only the case where the land lies in one district,
where the suit is brought, and the defendant resides in another
district of the same state. Process may then be served on the
defendant, the process being directed to the marshal of the de-
fendant's district. 5 Section 55 provides:
"Any suit of a local nature, at law or in equity, where the land
or other subject-matter of a fixed character lies partly in one
district and partly in another, within the same state, may be
brought in the district court of either district; and the court in
which it is brought shall have jurisdiction to hear and decide it,
and to cause mesne or final process to be issued and executed,
as fully as if the said subject-matter were wholly within the dis-
frict for which such court is constituted."
Here the scope is even narrower, covering only the unusual
case where the land (or other subject matter of a fixed character)
is situated in both of two districts within the same state, partly
in one of these districts and partly in another.?'
Venue and Process in Specified Proceedings in- Rem
Of infinitely greater importance, and far wider in scope than
the two sections just discussed, is section 57 of the Judicial Code.
In certain specified proceedings in rem, this permits service out
of the district of the res, or even substituted service. This is
discussed in the next section.
54 Casey v. Adams, loc. cit. supra note 52.
55 This statute was applied in Collett v. Adams (1919) 249 U. S. 545, 39
Sup. Ct. 372. Process here is directed to the marshal of the district in
which the defendant resides. Kuzma v. Withcrbcc, Shcrnzan & Co. (1915,
E. D. N. Y.) 232 Fed. 286.
56 Under this section, where a corporation owns lands in more than one
district in the same state, a district court of one of these districts may
appoint a receiver with power over all this land. Horn v,. Pcre Marquette
Ry., supra, note 7. See also City of Shelbyvrille -,. Glovcr (1910, C. C. A.
6th) 184 Fed. 234.
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7. VENUE AND PROCESS IN SPECIFIED PROCEEDINGS IN REM
Without some such provipion as this, the rule of Livingston v.
Jefferson57 broadly applied and the principle that federal process
does not transcend the limits of the district of issuance would
have worked almost intolerable hardship upon litigants in the
federal courts. Only cases of different districts within the con-
fines of a single state were covered by Sections 54 and 55 of the
Judicial Code. There was crying need for some broader pro-
vision to cover the case where the land or personalty was in one
state while the defendant or defendants were in other states. To
satisfy this need Section 57 was enacted, admirably adapted for
this purpose. This is a statute of venue and process only; there
must also.exist some ground, usually diverse citizenship, as well
as the other requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction by the dis-
trict court.58
The Text of the Statute
Reproduction in full of the exact words of Section 57 of this
statute (the Judicial Code), to which the reader can refer during
the discussion, seems justified by its practical importance.
"When in any suit commenced in any district court of the
United States to enforce any legal or equitable lien upon or claim
to, or to remove any incumbrance or lien or cloud upon the title
to real or personal property within the district where such suit
is brought, one or more of the defendants therein shall not be an
inhabitant of or found within the said district, or shall not volun-
tarily appear thereto, it shall be lawful for the court to make an
order directing such absent defendant or defendants to appear,
plead, answer, or demur by a day certain to be designated, which
order shall be served on such absent defendant or defendants, if
practicable, wherever found, and also upon the person or persons
in possession or charge of said property, if any there be; or where
such personal service upon such absent defendant or defendants
is not practicable, such order shall be published in such manner
as the court may direct, not less than once a week for six con-
secutive weeks. In case such absent defendant shall not appear,
plead, answer, or demur within the time so limited, or within
some further time, to be allowed by the court, in its discretion,
and upon proof of the service or publication of said order and of
the performance of the directions contained in the same, it shall
be lawful for the court to entertain jurisdiction, and proceed to
the hearing and adjudication of such suit in the same manner as
if such absent defendant had been served with process within the
said district; but said adjudication shall, as regards said absent
defendant or defendants without appearance, affect only the prop-
erty which shall have been the subject of the suit and under thejurisdiction of the court therein, within such district; and when
7 Supra note 50.
'sLadew v. Tennessee Copper Co. (1910) 218 U. S. 357, 31 Sup. Ct. 81;
Louisville & N. Ry. v. Western Union Telegraph Co. (1914) 234 U. S. 369,
34 Sup. Ct. 810; Kentucky Coal Lands Co. v. Mineral Development Co.,
supra note 48; Doherty v. McDowell (1921, D. C. Me.) 276 Fed. 728.
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a part of the said real or personal property against which such
proceeding shall be taken shall be within another district, but
within the same State, such suit may be brought in either dis-
trict in said State: Provided, however, That any defendant or
defendants not actually personally notified as above provided
may, at any time within one year after final judgmefit in any
suit mentioned in this section, enter his appearance in said suit
in said district court, and thereupon the said court shall make an
order setting aside the judgment therein and permitting said de-
fendant or defendants to plead therein on payment by him or
them of such costs as the court shall deem just; and thereupon
said suit shall be proceeded with to final judgment according to
law."Y
Venue Under the Statute
In cases within the purview of the statute, the venue is here
determined by the location of the property or res, the suit being
brought in the district in which the property or rcs is located
without regard to the residence of the plaintiffs or defendants,
no one of whom need be a resident of the district.3
Cases Falling within the Purview of the Statute
Led by the Supreme Court, the federal judges have given a
very strict and rigid interpretation to the words of the statute
defining its scope. The cases are legion, many of them illus-
trating the struggle of litigants who, finding their situation other-
wise desperate or hopeless, have sought protection under the
sheltering arm of Section 57. Two limitations, in particular, are
of prime importance. First, the proceeding must be truly iz rem
rather than i personam, to enforce a claim to property rather
than to impose a personal obligation upon the defendant; the
mere fact that the suit arose out of dealings with specific property
is quite insufficient. Secondly, the proceeding must be in aid of
a pre-existing claim, existing prior to the suit, and not a pro-
ceeding to create for the first time a claim as the effect of the
proceeding itself. These will appear in the discussion of the
cases, now to be attempted. Two classes of cases, in terms, are
covered by the statute: (1) Suits to en.force any legal or equitable
lien upon or claim to real or personal property within the district;
(2) Suits to remove any incumibrance or lien or cloud upon the
title to such property.
Ejectment6O falls rather clearly within the statute and, perhaps
59 Greeley v. Lowe, supra note 49; Ladcw -v. Tcnnessce Copper Co., mupra
note 58; Louisville & N. Ry. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., -upra note
58; Texas Co. v. Central Fuel Co. (1912, C. C. A. 8th) 194 Fed. 1; Albert v.
Bascom (1917, W. D. Tex.) 245 Fed. 149. The burden of proving the situa-
tion of the property within the district is on the complainant. Ckase v.
Wetzlar (1912) 225 U. S. 79, 32 Sup. Ct. 659.
o Spencer v. Kansas City Stock-Yards Co. (1893, C. C. W. D. Mo.) 56
Fed. 741; El7 Garden Co. v. Thayer Co., supra note 48; Kentucky Coal
Lands Co. v. Mineral Developnwnt Co., supra note 48.
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even more clearly suits for partition"l of land. Suits to remove
clouds upon title to realty are included in terms. 2 Suits to quiet
title03 to, and suits to foreclose mortgages 4 of, realty are suits to
enforce pre-existing claims to specific property. So are suits to
enforce the lien of a judgment on property within the district,0
as well as suits to set aside the lien of a judgment claimed to
have been procured by fraud.0 A close case, held to come within
the statute, was a suit by unsecured creditors of an insolvent cor-
poration to set aside a conveyance of certain property to secure
several preferred creditors.61
An interesting contrast is afforded by the cases of Goodman v.
Niblack 8 and Fayerweather v. RitUh. 9  In the Goodman case,
held within the statute, a bill in equity was filed to enforce a
claim or lien as to a specific fund. The Fayerweather case, held
without the statute, was a suit by heirs against trustees to recover
a residue in the trustees' hands;, but no specific property, real
or personal, was sought to be affected.
Now for the negative side of the picture. Suits to abate nui-
sances, 70 suits to compel specific performance either of contracts
to convey realty7' or of contracts to pay the purchase price% are
actions in personam, not in rem, so the statute excludes themY'
61 Greeley v. Lowe, supra, note 49; German Savings & Loan Society v.
Tull, supra note 49.
02 Dick v. Foraker (1894) 155 U. S. 404, 15 Sup. Ct. 124; Louisville &
N. Ry. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., supra note 58. See also Citizens'
Savings & Trust Co. v. Illinois Central Ry. (1907) 205 U. S. 46, 27 Sup.
Ct. 425, iri which the suit was to cancel certain deeds and leases consti-
tuting a cloud on the title.
03 United States v. Southern Pacific Co. (1894, C. C. S. D. Calif.) 63
Fed. 481.04 Seybert v. Shamokin & Mt. C. Ry. (1901, C. C. M. D. Pa.) 110 Fed.
810; Burke v. Mountain Timber Co. (1915, W. D. Wash.) 224 Fed. 591.03 De Hierapolis v. Lawrence (1899, C. C. S. D. N. Y.) 99 Fed. 321;
Hultberg v. Anderson (1909, C. C. Kan.) 170 Fed. 657. See also Perez v.
Fernandez (1911) 220 U. S. 224, 31 Sup. Ct. 412.
GoMcDaniel v. Traylor (1905) 196 U. S. 415, 25 Sup. Ct. 369.
o7 Mellen v. Moline Iron Works (1889) 131 U. S. 352, 9 Sup. Ct. 781. It
would seem that this case can be sustained only on the theory that this
property constituted for these creditors a trust fund as to which they had
an equitable title. See Graham v. Railroad Co. (1880) 102 U. S. 148, 161.
But see Bank of Commerce & Trust v. McArthur (1918, S. D. Fla.) 248
Fed. 138, holding that a creditor, having no lien, cannot under Judicial
Code, sec. 57, sue to set aside a transfer of personalty by a creditor.
08 (1880) 102 U. S. 556.
09 (1898, C. C. S. D. N. Y.) 89 Fed. 385. See also Hannan v. Slush
(1922, E. D. Mich.) 283 Fed. 211; s. c. (1924, C. C. A. 6th) 299 Fed. 1022.7 0 Ladew v. Tennessee Copper Co., supra note 58.
7 1 Municipal Investment Co. v. Gardiner (1894, C. C. Ind.) 62 Fed. 954;
Gotter v. McCulley (1923, ,E. D. Wash.) 292 Fed. 382.72 Nelson v. Husted (1910, C. C. Minn.) 182 Fed. 921.
73 The same is true of a mere suit to cancel or rescind a contract. In-
surance Co. v. Bangs, supra note 38; Camp v. Bonsal (1913, C. C. A. 4th)
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Condemnation suits under the power of eminent domain are not
included; for here there is no pre-exi.sting title to the property
sought to be condemned, no claim or lien thereon, auterior to the
condemnation proceeding. 4
By its very terms, the statute applies to personal property as
well as to real; in practice, though, the realty cases greatly pre-
dominate. Since, as has been pointed out, the venue is the dis-
trict in which the property is situated, this involves the question
of the situs of property. As to realty, which is necessarily flxed
and immovable, there is little trouble; in connection with per-
sonalty, particularly intangible personal property such as notesPs
and corporate stock,-( even under this statute, there is grave diffi-
culty. The question of the situs of personal property cannot well
be discussed here.
Ordinary proceedings by foreign attachment are not contem-
plated here; for attachment in the federal courts is merely an
incident to personal suit, which requires valid service of process
on the defendant conferring jurisdiction over him personallyT
Procedzre uzder the Statute
The statute prescribes the procedure under it. If "one or more
of the defendants therein shall not be an inhabitant of nor found
within the said district or shall not voluntarily appear thereon,"
the court may make an order directing absent defendants to ap-
pear or plead by a certain day. This order shall be served; if
that is practicable, on such defendants wherever found (even in
203 Fed. 913. But suit is possible under the statute on contracts giing a
lien on property. Citize?" Savings & Trust Co. v. Illihois Central Ry.,
supra, note 62; Texas Co. v. Central Fuel Oil Co., supra note 59. See alzo
Waterloo Creamery Co. v. National Bank (1922, E. D. 'Iich.) 232 Fed.
197, in which suit for accounting and for loss of property was held with-
out the statute. See also General Inrestment Co. v. Lake S11ro & M. S.
Ry. (1922) 260 U. S. 261, 43 Sup. Ct. 106, holding an injunction suit to
prevent railroad companies from consolidating to be in personam.
74 Western, Union Telegraph Co. v. Louisville & N. Ry. (1912, E. D.
Tenn.) 201 Fed. 932. See the remarkable case of Mutual Life Izuruaco
Co. v. Painter (1915, D. C. Ald.) 220 Fed. 99S, in which the plaintiff un-
successfully tried to bring under this statute a claim for the examination
of the vital organs of a dead policy holder.
7r Critchton v. Wingfield (1922) 25S U. S. 66, 42 Sup. Ct. 229. Sea as to
situs of patent right under this statute Standard Gas Power Co. of Georgia
v. Standard Gas Power Co. of Delaware (1915, N. D. Ga.) 224 Fed. 990.
76 Jellenik v. Huron Copper Co. (1900) 177 U. S. 1, 20 Sup. Ct. 559;
Blake v. Foreman Bros. Banking Co. (1914, N. D. Ill.) 218 Fed. 2G4; Hud-
son Navigation Co. v. Murray (1916, D. C. N. J.) 236 Fed. 419; Doherty
v. McDowell, supra note 58; Vidalv. South America Securitive Co., at,.pra
note 16; Myers v. Occidental Oil Corporation (1923, D. C. Del.) 288 Fed.
997; American Seating Co. v. Bullard (1923, C. C. A. 0th) 290 Fed. 896.
77 EX parte Railway Co. (1880) 103 U. S. 794; Big Vein Coal Co. v. Read
(1913) 229 U. S. 31,33 Sup. Ct. 694; Pratt v. Dcnvcr & R. G. W. Ry. (1922,
D. C. Minn.) 284 Fed. 1007.
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districts in other states),7s and also on the persons in possession
of the property, "if any there be." Service on absent defendants
in districts in other states must be the service of this order of
the court by the marshal of the district in which the defendant
is found;79 and there can be no service of the ordinary federal
process by such marshal.e Since the statute is an exception to,
and its terms therefore the warrant for departing from, the gen-
eral principle that federal process is limited to its own district,
the federal courts are inclined to insist on a rather strict compli-
ance with the statutory provisions.
When actual personal service of the court order on the absent
defendant is not practicable in any district, then the court order
"shall be published in such manner as the court- may direct, not
less than once a week for six consecutive weeks." Before issuing
a direction for service by publication, the court should be assured
that reasonable efforts have been made to serve the order person-
ally on the defendant without success.8 '
When all the defendants can be served within the district of
the suit, this should be done; for the provisions as to the court
order do not then apply. It would seem as to a defendant re-
siding in a different district of the same state that Judicial Code
54 would apply, permitting service of ordinary process by the
marshal of such district; though this has been denied.82 Prob-
ably, in such a case, the court order would be safer.
Effect of the Judgment or Decree
As to absent defendants, those served with the court order
either personally or by publication who do not appear in the suit,
the adjudication affects "only the property which shall have been
the subject of the suit and under the jurisdiction of the court
therein, within such district." 8 The judgment or decree is then
strictly in rem, binding the res completely, but no in personam
judgment can be entered; so that in a suit to enforce a lien on
property in the district, the court can subject all this property
to the lien, yet cannot enter a personal decree against the defend-
78 Meen v. Moline Iron Works, supra note 67.
79 Evans v. Charles Scribner's Sons (1893, C. C. N. D. Ga.) 58 Fed. 303.
SOJennings v. Johnson (1906, C. C. A. 5th) 148 Fed. 337; Seybort v.
Shamokin & Mt. C. Ry., supra note 64. See also Greeley v. Lowe, supra
note 49. And see Doherty v. McDowell, supra note 58, as to the strictness
with which this order must be carried out.
8IMcDonald v. Cooper (1887, C. C. Or.) 32 Fed. 745; Hicks V. Crawford
Coal & Iron Co. (1911, C. C. M. D. Tenn.) 190 Fed. 334.
82 Seybert v. Shamokin & Mt. C. Ry., supra note 64.
18 But provision is made where the property is within the same state
but in different districts.
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ant for the excess of the plaintiff's claim beyond the value of
the property 4
When, however, service of ordinary process is had on the de-
fendant within the district of suit, or when the defendant subjects
himself personally to the jurisdiction of the court by a gener-1
appearance, it would seem that the suit becomes one i persoizam
and a valid personal judgment could be entered against him.
One final proviso in the statute permits "any defendant or defend-
ants not actually personally notified as above provided" to ap-
pear "within one year after final judgment", have the judgment
set aside, plead "on payment of such costs as the court shall deem
just;" and thereupon the suit "shall be proceeded with to final
judgment according to law." The Supreme Court has made two
things clear: first, this proviso applies only when the service of
the court order was by publication, not by personal service of the
order in any district (but in service by publication, information
of the pendency of the suit by letter of extraneous information is
immaterial) ; secondly, the right within the year to have the case
reopened (in a proper case) under the proviso is a genuine right
which cannot be conditioned on any terms save the payment of
costs.
8 4
"It is fundamental that relief of that (a personal decree) character
cannot be had against non-resident defendants without personal service
of process within the jurisdiction or such general appearance in the ease
as amounts thereto". Grable v. Killits, (1922, C. C. A. 0th) 282 Fed. 1S5,
at 194, citing Pennoyer v. Neff (1877) 95 U. S. 7114. See also Robertcson .
Railroad Labor Board, supra note 38.
